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Abstract
Online rating systems are subject to malicious behaviors mainly by posting unfair rat-
ing scores. Users may try to individually or collaboratively promote or demote a prod-
uct. Collaborating unfair rating ’collusion’ is more damaging than individual unfair
rating. Although collusion detection in general has been widely studied, identifying
collusion groups in online rating systems is less studied and needs more investigation.
In this paper, we study impact of collusion in online rating systems and asses their
susceptibility to collusion attacks. The proposed model uses a frequent itemset mining
algorithm to detect candidate collusion groups. Then, several indicators are used for
identifying collusion groups and for estimating how damaging such colluding groups
might be. Also, we propose an algorithm for finding possible collusive subgroup inside
larger groups which are not identified as collusive. The model has been implemented
and we present results of experimental evaluation of our methodology.
1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation and Background
Web 2.0 technologies have connected people all around the world. People can easily
contact each other, collaborate on doing jobs or share information through mass collab-
orative systems which also are called crowdsourcing systems [4]. One major group of
crowdsourcing systems are used for rating products on the web which are called Online
Rating Systems. Online rating systems help people judge the quality of products. Since
the number of providers and their products is extremely large and ever growing, it is
impossible for users to base their choices on their trust in providers they are already
familiar with. For that reason the users usually look for the opinions and feedbacks
collected from other users who have used or purchased the product before. Providers
advertise their products in online rating systems and customers rate them based on their
experiences of dealing with that particular product. Based on the rating scores received
from customers, the system builds a rating score for every product representing the
quality of the product from customers’ point of view. Yelp1, IMDb2 and Amazon3 are
some of the popular online rating systems.
The big issue in these systems is the trustworthiness of cast feedback. Many pieces
of evidence [7, 6] show that users may try to manipulate the ratings of the products by
casting unfair rating. Unfair ratings are rating scores which are cast regardless of the
quality of the product and usually are given based on personal vested interests of the
users. For example, providers may try to submit supporting feedback to increase the
rating of their product and consequently increase their income [6] . The providers also
may attack their competitors by giving low scores in their feedback on their competi-
tor’s products. Another study shows that sellers in eBay boost their reputations unfairly
by buying or selling feedback [7].
Unfair ratings are broadly divided into two categories [26, 23] : (i) individual and
(ii) collaborative. Individual unfair ratings are rating scores which people give unfairly
without collaborating with others. Such ratings are given for several reasons: lack of
expertise, dishonesty or irresponsibility of the user, in the form of, for example, random
choice of their rating. Several models have already been proposed for identifying and
eliminating these types of scores.
Collaborative unfair ratings are a result of a group of users who try to manipulate
the rating of a product collaboratively. This type of unfair rating is usually planned by
the product owner or her competitors. The collaborative unfair ratings which are also
called collusion [22, 23] by their nature are more sophisticated and harder to detect
than individual unfair ratings [22]. For that reason, in this work we focus on studying
and identifying collaborative unfair ratings.
Collusion detection methods are widely studied in P2P systems [3, 10, 13]. In P2P
systems, users have some pairwise relations which simplify finding collusion between
them. In contrast with P2P systems, in online rating systems generally reviewers have
no such pairwise relations. Therefore, finding collusive groups in these systems re-
quires other indicators rather than direct relation. Similarity of cast rating scores on
same products, time window in which those ratings are cast, deviation from majority,
etc are some indicators which are used for detecting collusion groups. [17, 16].
1http://www.yelp.com
2http://www.imdb.com/
3http://www.amazon.com/
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1.2 Problem Definition
While there already are rater sophisticated collusion detection systems, such systems
still face some unresolved challenges. The first problem is that most of the existing
collusion detection approaches focus on planned collusions, i.e., they suppose that there
are some known teams in the systems, for example, the providers of a product, which
may try to collude following some pre-determined collusion plan [11, 24]. It is obvious
that in an online open-to-all crowdsourcing system this model is not applicable.
The second challenge arises when a group of reviewers try to completely take con-
trol of a product i.e., when the number of unfair reviewers is significantly higher than
the number of honest users; the existing models usually can not detect such a group.
Also, the existing models do not perform well against intelligent attacks, in which
group members try to give an appearance of honest users. For example, typically they
will not deviate from the majority’s ranking on most of the cast feedback and target
only a small fraction of the products. Such attacks are hard to identify using the exist-
ing methods [24].
The next issue is that all existing methods check a group as a whole, i.e., they
calculate collusion indicators for the group and check its degree of collusiveness. There
are cases in which a large group of people have rated the same group of products, and
thus could be considered as a potential collusion group. Based on other indicators,
such group might be subsequently deemed as non collusive. However, in such cases
there may exist some smaller collusive sub-groups inside the large group which are
collusive, but when put along with others they might be undetected. Detection of such
sub-groups is not addressed in the existing collusion detection models.
1.3 Contribution and Outline
Collusion of groups is best represented using collusion graphs, and such graphs are best
used for collusion detection by means of a rather generic query language. To the best of
our knowledge, there are no easy to use, reusable tools for collusion detection based on
graph model representation of rating data collected form online systems and their query
using a simple language. In this paper we propose such a model for detecting collusion
groups employing six indicators. Four indicators are used for assessing the degree of
collusiveness of a group and two indicators to assess how potentially damaging the
identified group might be. Our algorithm employs existing clustering techniques, such
as Frequent Itemset Mining (FIM) technique [1]. The novelty of this work is in a new
model, some new collusion indicators and an associated query language. In summary,
we present here:
• A novel approach for analyzing behavior of the reviewers in an online rating
system. Besides indicators used in the already existing work, we also define two
novel indicators:
1. an indicator which we call Suspiciousness of a reviewer, which is a metric
to estimate to what extent ratings posted by such reviewer correspond to
majority consensus. Such indicator is calculated using two distance func-
tions: the Lp distance and the Uniform distance.
2. an indicator we call Spamicity which estimates the likelihood that a partic-
ular rating score given to a product by a reviewer is unfair.
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ASIN  Title Category 
0827229534 Patterns of Preaching: A Sermon 
Sampler 
Book 
0842328327 Life Application Bible Commentary: 
1 and 2 Timothy and Titus 
Book 
… … … 
B00000AU3R Batik Music 
B00005NTSV Come What May Music 
   
0790747324 The Time Machine DVD 
B000056PNC Mark Messier - Leader, Champion & 
Legend 
DVD 
… … … 
(a) Sample of Available Products
CustomerID  Product ASIN Time Rating 
A2JW67OY8U6HHK 0827229534 2000-07-28 5 
A2591BUPXCS705 0842328327 2004-08-19 4 
… … … … 
A2O3PW57IFNUHV B00000AU3R 2000-05-22 5 
A3FNRL9QYZOBDH B00000AU3R 2002-08-19 4 
… … … … 
AIMBOX2T0HV1H 0790747324 2000-04-02 4 
AA5ELPH4F7AIP 0790747324 2001-1-15 1 
A22IK3I6U76GX0 0790747324 2000-12-26 5 
… … … … 
A1791R558AL0W3 B000056PNC 2000-12-09 5 
… … … … 
(b) Some Ratings Cast on Products
Figure 1.1: A Sample of AMZLog
• We propose a framework for collusion detection in online rating systems. The
proposed framework uses an algorithm called RanKit and six indicators for collu-
sion detection. RankIt uses two sub-algorithms which are built on FIM technique
for finding potential collusion groups.
• We propose a new notion and presentation for collusion groups called biclique.
A biclique is a group of users and a group of products such that every reviewer
in such a group has rated every product in the corresponding group of products.
• We propose a new metric called Damaging Impact (DI) to represent how poten-
tially damaging the identified biclique is. DI is calculated based on the number
of reviewers involved in collusion and number of products which have been tar-
geted.
• We propose a graph data model for representing rating activities in online rating
system. This model allows: (i) representing products, reviewers and the rating
scores reviewers have cast on products and (ii) identifying bicliques of colluders.
• Such identification is effected using a query language which we propose, used
for obtaining information on such rating graphs.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we define and
formulate the problem of collusion detection. In section 3 we propose our method of
finding candidate collusion groups. Section 4 presents collusion indicators. In section 5
we show how we find collusive sub-groups. Section 6 presents our proposed collusion
detection framework. In section 7 we propose implementation details and also evaluate
results. We discuss related work in section 8 and conclude in section 9.
2 Preliminaries
In this section we present: (i) an example scenario for online rating systems; (ii) a graph
data model for representing online rating systems; and (iii) the process for generating
proposed graph model from online rating system logs.
2.1 Example Scenario
Amazon is one of well-known online markets. Providers or sellers put products on the
Amazon online market. Buyers go to Amazon and buy products if they find them of
an acceptable quality, price, etc. Users also can share their experiences of the products
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with others as reviews or rating scores they cast on products. Rating scores are numbers
in range [1, 5]. Amazon generates an overall rating rank for every product based on the
rating scores cast by users. There is evidence (see [6]) showing that the Amazon rating
system has widely been subject to collusion and unfair ratings.
We use the log of Amazon online rating system1 which was collected by Leskovec
et. al for analyzing dynamics of viral Marketing[14], referred in the following as AM-
ZLog. This log contains more than 7 million ratings cast on the quality of more then
500 thousands of products collected in the summer of 2006. Figure 1.3 illustrates a
sample of data stored in AMZLog.
2.2 Data Model
We define a graph data model (i.e. ORM: Online Rating Model) for organizing a set
of entities (e.g. reviewers and products) and relationships among them in an online
rating system. ORM can be used to distinguish between fair and unfair ratings in an
online rating system and helps build a more realistic ranking score for every product.
In ORM, we assume that interactions between reviewers and products are represented
by a directed graphG = (V,E) where V is a set of nodes representing entities andE is
a set of directed edges representing relationships between nodes. Each edge is labeled
by a triplet of numbers, as explained below.
ORM Entities
An entity is an object that exists independently and has a unique identity. ORM consists
of three types of entities: products, reviewers and bicliques.
Product. A product is an item which has been put on the system to be rated by system
users in terms of quality or any other possible aspects. Products are described by a set
of attributes such as the unique indicator (i.e. ID), title, and category (e.g. book, cd,
track, etc). We assume that there are Np products P = {pj|1 ≤ j ≤ Np} in the system
to be rated.
Reviewer. A reviewer is a person who rated at least one product in the system. Re-
viewers are described by a set of attributes and are identified by their unique identifier
(i.e. ID) in the system. We assume that there are Nu reviewers U = {ui|1 ≤ i ≤ Nu}
rating products in an online rating system.
ORM Relationships
A relationship is a directed link between a pair of entities, which is associated with a
predicate defined on the attributes of entities that characterizes the relationship. We
assume that no reviewer can rate a product more than once. So, in ORM model, there
is at most one relation between every product and reviewer. We define only one type
of relationship in ORM: Rating Relationship.
When a reviewer rates a product, a rating relationship is established between corre-
sponding reviewer and product. We assume that R is the set of all rating relationships
between reviewers and products i.e. eij is the rating the ui has given to pj . A rating
relation is labeled with the values of the following three attributes:
1. value: The value is the evaluation of the the reviewer from the quality of the
product and is in the range [1,M ],M > 1. M is a system dependent constant.
1http://snap.stanford.edu/data/amazon-meta.html
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u1
u4
u5
p1
p3
p2
attack
attack
attack
attack
attack
attack
support
support
support
Clique-Folder
Figure 2.1: An example of a biclique.
for example in Amazon, rating scores reside between 1 and 5. We denote the
value field of the rating by eij .v.
2. time: The time in which the rating has been posted to the system. The time field
of the rating is denoted by eij .t.
3. Spamicity: As mentioned earlier, we assume that every reviewer can be in a
unique relation with each product (i.e., we do not allow multi-graphs). However,
in real world, e.g. in Amazon rating system, one reviewer can rate a product
several times. Some collusion detection models like [16] just eliminate duplicate
rating scores. We rather use them for the purpose of detecting unfair ratings.
Spamicity shows what fraction of all scores cast for this particular product are
cast by the reviewer in the considered relationship with this product. We denote
the Spamicity of a rating relation by eij .spam. This will be detailed in section
2.4.
Clearly, the rating relationship may be labeled with other optional attributes.
2.3 biclique
A biclique is a sub-graph of ORM containing a set of reviewers R, a set of products P
and their corresponding relationships Rel. All reviewers in R have rated all products
in that P , i.e., there is a rating relationship between every r ∈ R and every p ∈ P . A
biclique is denoted by CL = {R,P, }.
For example, CL = {{r1, r4, r5}, {p1, p2, p3}, {r1 −→ r1, ...}} means that review-
ers r1, r4, and r5 all have voted on p1,p2 and p3. Figure 2.1 illustrates this biclique.
2.4 Data Preprocessing
Since we are proposing a specific graph data model for online rating systems, we have
to process data logs and prepare them to fit in our data model. Therefore, we apply
several preprocessing steps as data preparation step.
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• We delete inactive reviewers and unpopular products. We suppose that if a re-
viewer has rated just a few products, she can not be a threat to the reliability of
the system, even if she has participated in some collusive activities. For example,
we deleted from the data log AMZLog all reviewers who reviewed less than 10
products. Also, the products with only a few ratings are not attractive for users,
so there is a very low chance for a collusion on such a product. So, we delete all
such unpopular products; in case of AMZLog, we have deleted the products on
which less than 10 ratings are cast.
• We found in the AMZLog some products which were rated several times by the
same user. Posting multiple reviews for a product is common [16] and due to
several reasons. For example, a buyer may rate a product low because she is
not able to use it properly, but after reading manuals or receiving support, she
changes her mind and rates the product highly [cikm10]. However, posting a
large number of votes on the same product, is a strong indicator of a suspicious
behavior of the user. When a user has posted several rating scores we choose the
last one as the final opinion of the user about the product. To distinguish between
such rating and the normal single ratings, we also record the spamicity value of
the rating relationship between the reviewer and product. Thus, let that E(j) be
the set of all ratings given to product j and E(i, j) is the set of all ratings given
by reviewer i to the product j. We calculate spamicity degree of the relationship
between the reviewer ri and the product pj using the equation 2.1:
eij .spam =
{
0 if (|E(i, j)| ≤ 2)
|E(i,j)|
|E(j)| otherwise
(2.1)
In the above equation allowing casting two votes instead of one accommodates
for the situations where a genuine ”mind change” has taken place, as explained
earlier. The spamicity parameter is used in Section 4 as an indicator for finding
collusion groups.
• The time format in AMZLog is ‘yyyy-mm-dd’. When preprocessing data, we
change this time to an integer number. The number shows the number of days
between the date on which the first ranking score in the system has been posted
and the day in which the rating score has been cast.
3 Finding Collusion biclique Candidates
In order to find collusion bicliques, the first step is to identify all collaborative rating
groups as collusion biclique candidates, then check them to find real collusion groups.
We use Algorithm 1 which employs FIM technique to find bicliques. Algorithm 1 is
applied to an initialized array of biclique candidates denoted by C and gives the list of
all bicliques denoted by FC. To initialize C, we generated a corresponding biclique
for every reviewer. The biclique contains the ID of the reviewer as the only member of
its R, the list of all products the reviewer has rated as the members of P and all rating
scores cast by the reviewer as the members of Rel. The NextC is a temporary list of
bicliques used just for transferring groups found in every iteration to the next iteration
of the algorithm.
In every step we firstly combine all members of C, to find possible larger groups.
The problem of finding all collaboration groups is an NP-Complete problem. We add
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Algorithm 1 Finding All biclique candidates
Input: C as the set of all initial bicliques.
Output: FC as the set of all candidate spam bicliques
repeat
Empty NextC
for all c ∈ C do
c.Processed = false
end for
for i = 1→ (C.size− 1) do
for j = i+ 1→ C.size do
c3.P = ci.P ∩ ci.P /* c3 is a temporary variable */
if c3.P.size ≥MinP then
c3.R = ci.R ∪ cj.R
Add c3 to NextC
ci.P rocessed = true
cj .P rocessed = true
end if
end for
end for
for all c ∈ C do
if (c.Processed == false ∧ (c.R.size ≥MinR)) then
Move c To FC
end if
Remove c from C
end for
C = NextC
Empty NextC
until (C.size > 0)
return FC
some constrains to decrease the time complexity and solve the problem in an accepted
time period. These constrains are mainly applied as the accepted size of the R and
P for every group. We suppose that number of reviewers in every group should be at
least MinR and the number of products at least MinP . We find the optimum values
of MinR and MinP by experiment. MinR and MinP may impact the number of
identified groups, but will not affect the process of collusion detection. We use the
minimum possible values for these variables which are 2 for MinR and 3 for MinP .
We do n set MinP to 2, because it is highly possible that two honest reviewers rate
two same products by accident, similarity of interest, etc.
4 Indicators
4.1 Collusion Indicators
It is almost impossible to find collusion bicliques by analyzing the behavior of individ-
ual members or even only on the posted rating scores. Rather, several indicators must
be checked to realize in what extent a group is a collusion group [17]. In this section
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we propose some indicators and show how they indicate to a possible collusive activity.
Group Rating Value Similarity (GVS)
A group of reviewers can be considered as a collusion biclique, if they are posting
similar rating values for similar products. For example, all of them promote product
p1 and demote p2 by similar rating scores. To check this similarity we at first find the
Pairwise Rating Value Similarity between every pair of reviewers in the group. Pairwise
rating value similarity denoted by V S(i, j) shows in what extent ui and uj have cast
similar rating scores to every product in g.P .
We use cosine similarity model, a well-known model for similarity detection [19],
for finding similarities between group members. Since V S(i, j) is the cosine of the
angle between two vectors containing ratings of two reviewers, it is a value in range
[0, 1]. The value 1 means completely same and 0 means completely different.
Suppose that ui and uj are two members of group g i.e. ui and uj ∈ g.R . We
calculate similarity between them as follows:
V S(i, j) =
∑
k∈g.R vik × vjk√∑
k∈g.R(vik)
2 ×
√∑
k∈g.R(vjk)
2
(4.1)
Then we calculate an overall degree od similarity for every group to show how all
members are similar in terms of value they have posted as rating scores and call it
Group Rating Value Similarity (GVS). GVS for every group is the minimum amount
of pairwise similarity between group members.So, the GVS of group g is calculated as
follows:
GV S(g) = min(V S(i, j)), for all ui and uj ∈ g.R (4.2)
The bigger the GV S, the more similar the group members are in terms of their
posted rating values.
Group Rating Time Similarity (GTS)
Another indicator for finding collusive groups is that they usually cast their ratings in
a short period of time. In other words, when a group of users try to promote or demote
a product they attempt to do it in a short period of time to gain benefits, get paid, etc.
We can use this as an indicator to find collusion groups. To find calculate Group rating
Time Similarity (GTS), we at first find the the Time Window (TW) in which the rating
scores have been posted on product p, p ∈ g.P . The time window starts when the first
rating posted and ends when the last one cast. We use the size of the time window
in comparison to a constant MaxTW to show how big this time window is. The
parameter MaxTW is the maximum size of a time window which my be supposed as
collusive. We suppose that the time windows larger than MaxTW are wide enough
and we do not suppose them az indicators to a possible collusion. So for every product
in the group we have:
TW (j) =

0 , if MaxT (j)−MinT (j) > MaxTW
1− MaxT (j)−MinT (j)
MaxTW
, Otherwise
(4.3)
where
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MinT = min(eij .t) ,
MaxT = max(eij .t) ,
j ∈ g.P for all i ∈ g.R
Now, we choose the largest TW (j) as the degree of time similarity between the
ratings posted by group members on the target products. Therefore we say:
GTS(g) = max(TW (j)), for all pj ∈ g.P (4.4)
The bigger the GTS, the more similar the group members are in terms of their
posted rating times.
Group Ratings Spamicity (GRS)
As we described in Section 2.4, the spamicity of a rating shows the suspiciousness
of the rating score because of high number of ratings posted by same user to a same
product ( equation (2.1)). We define the Group Rating Spamicity (GRS) as the ratio
of the weight of spam ratings and the weight of all ratings in the group. We calculate
GRS as follows:
GRS(g) =
∑
e∈g.Rel e.v × e.spam∑
e∈g.Rel e.v
(4.5)
Group Members Suspiciousness (GMS)
Suspicious users are users whose behavior indicates that they can be potentially col-
luders. We identify suspicious users in four steps.
Step 1: Suppose that E(j) is the set of all ratings posted for the product pj . We
find the median of the members of E(j) and denote it by mj . Then, we calculate the
average distance of all ratings posted on pj from the median mj and denote it by dj .
We calculate the average distance using equation (4.6).
dj =
√∑
i∈E(j)(eij .v −mj)
2
||E(j)||
(4.6)
Now, we calculate a credibility degree for every eij ∈ E. We denote this credibility
degree ϕij and use it to eliminate the ratings fall far away from the majority. The ϕij
is calculated as follows.
ϕij =
{
1 if (mj − dj) ≤ rij ≤ (mj + dj)
0 otherwise (4.7)
Equation (4.7) shows that the ratings which fall in range mj ± dj) are considered
as credible and the rest are identified as unfair.
Step 2: In this step, we recalculate the averages of all credible ratings on the product
pj and assume that it is a dependable guess for the real rating of the product. We show
it by gj and calculate it as follows.
gj =
∑
i∈E(j)(eij .v × ϕij)∑
i∈E(j) ϕij
(4.8)
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Step 3: In the third step, using the ratings we calculated for every product we build
two error rates for every reviewer. The first error rate is the Lp error rate which is
Lp−norm of all differences between the ratings cast by the reviewer on the quality of
pj and the gj . We denote the Lp error rate of reviewer ui by LP (i). Suppose that Ji is
the set of indices of all products have been rated by ui. The LP (i) we calculate is in
fact L2 − norm and is calculated as follows.
LP (i) =
√∑
j∈Ji
(∣∣∣eij .v − gj∣∣∣)2 (4.9)
The second error rate we calculate for every reviewer is the uniform norm of dif-
ferences between eij .v and gj for all products have been rated by ui. We call this error
rate uniform error rate of ui, denote it by UN(i) and calculate as follows:
UN(i) = max
(∣∣∣eij .v − gj∣∣∣) , j ∈ Ji (4.10)
Step 4: In this step, we trap the suspicious reviewers. The suspicious reviewers are the
people who have have large LP (i) or while they have normal LP (i) they have high
UN(i) values. To identify suspicious reviewers, we try to identify the normal range of
error rates for all reviewers. Based on the calculated range, the outliers are considered
as suspicious reviewers. Suppose that L̂P is the median of all LP (i) and ÛN is the
median of allUN(i). Also, we assume thatLP andUN are the standard distance of all
LP (i) and UN(i) respectively , calculated similar to the method proposed in equation
(4.6). The list of suspicious reviewers is denoted by S and built using equation 4.12.
S =
{
u|
(
u ∈ U
)
and
((
LP (u) in (L̂P ± LP )
)
or(
UN(u) in (ÛN ± UN)
))} (4.11)
Now, we define GMS of a group as the ratio of the suspicious members of a group
and the total number of members of a group. Hence, suppose that for group g, S(g) is
the list of suspicious users of the group. The GMS is calculated as follows:
GMS(g) =
|S(g)|
|g.R|
where S(g) = (g.R) ∩ S (4.12)
4.2 Defectiveness Indicators
The defectiveness of a collusion group is its power to impact normal behavior of system
and the ratings of products. There are two important parameters reflecting defective-
ness of a group: size of the group and the number of products have been attacked by
the group. The bigger these two parameters are, the more defective the collusive group
is.
Group Size (GS)
Size of a collusive group (GS) is proportional to the number of reviewers who have
collaborated in the group (g.R.size). The GS is calculated using the equation (6.1).
GS(g) =
|g.R|
max(|g.R|)
where g is a group (4.13)
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GS is a parameter between (0, 1] and showing how large is the number of members of
a group in comparison with other groups.
Group Target Products Size (GPS)
The size of the target of a group (GPS) is proportional to the number of products which
have been attacked by members of a collusion group. The bigger the GTS is, the more
defective the group will be. GTS is calculated as follows:
GPS(g) =
|g.P |
max(|g.P |)
where g is a group (4.14)
GTS as proposed in equation 4.14, is a number in range (0, 1] showing how large is the
size of the group target in comparison with other groups.
5 Finding Collusive Sub-Bicliques
When finding bicliques, we try to maximize size of the group, i.e. g.R.size, to find the
largest possible candidates bicliques. It is possible that a large group be identified as an
honest group due to large and diverse number of users who have just rated same sub-set
of products. But possibly, there exist some smaller groups inside the large groups that
can build a collusive sub-groups. In this section we propose an algorithm for finding
these possible sub-groups.
Algorithm 2 shows the process of finding sub-groups in a candidate group g. In
this algorithm, we use the idea of finding candidate bicliques in Section 3. At first we
build one biclique for every relation in the g.Rel. Then we try to merge every two
generated bicliques. If the resulted biclique has both GV S and GTS greater than a
threshold called δ, we keep it for next steps. we continue this process until all possible
sub-groups are identified. The reason that GV S and GTS are chosen is that if a group
does not have similar rating scores or they are posted in a wide time range there is
a very small possibility that the group is a collusive group [17]. Threshold δ shows
the minimum value of DOC and DI and its default value experimentally is set to 0.4
(see Section 7). Users can change the value of δ as they intend. We use δ for finding
sub-bicliques and also querying bicliques 6.
δ is the collusion threshold. Details can be found in Section 6.
6 Collusion Detection Framework
In this section we propose a collusion detection framework. We discuss the basics and
principals of the framework, its overall architecture and the query language we propose
in thispaper.for and show how it can help users query collusion graph.
6.1 Overview
To find collusive groups we firstly calculate collusion indicators for every identified
biclique. Our proposed collusion detection model employs algorithms (1) and (2) and
indicators proposed in section 4 to effectively find collusive bicliques. It is notable that
it is not possible to automatically find out if a group is collusive or not. So, using the
calculated indicators we build a degree of collusion (DOC) for every biclique. DOC
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Algorithm 2 Finding Possible Collusive Sub-Bicliques
Input: cl as a biclique.
Output: Scl as the set of all collusive sub-bicliques, initially empty
Build C as the set of sub-bicliques of cl each having only one relation.
Empty NextS
repeat
for all c ∈ C do
c.Processed = false
end for
for i = 1→ (C.size− 1) do
for j = i+ 1→ C.size do
c3.P = Merge(ci.P, ci.P ) /* c3 is a temporary variable */
Calculate all indicators for c3
if (c.DI > δ) then
Add c3 to NextS
ci.P rocessed = true
cj .P rocessed = true
end if
end for
end for
for all c ∈ C do
if (c.Processed == false) ∧ (c.P.size > MinP ) ∧ (c.R.size > MinR)
then
Move c To Scl.
Remove c from C
end if
end for
C = NextS
Empty NextS
until (C.size > 0)
return Scl
shows in what extent a group behaves like a collusion group. DOC is an aggregation
of four collusion indicator. Since in different environments, the importance of these
indicators may be different, our models enables users to assign weight to every indi-
cator to have its adequate weight in DOC. Suppose that WGV S , WGTS , WGRS and
WGMS are corresponding weights for GRS, GTS, GRS and GMS respectively so
that WGV S +WGTS +WGRS +WGMS = 1. The default values of all these weights
are 0.25. The DOC is calculated as follows:
DOC(g) = GV S ×WGV S +GTS ×WGTS
+GRS ×WGRS +GMS ×WGMS
(6.1)
Moreover, for every group we calculate damaging impact (DI) to show how dam-
aging the group can be in the system. Two parameters are used in calculating DI. The
first parameter is GPS, that shows the ratio of the total products which have been tar-
geted by the collusion group and GS which shows the ratio of the users which have
been included in collusion. We calculate DI as follows:
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Algorithm 3 Collusion Detection Algorithm
Input: ORM Graph.
Output: C as the set of all collusive Bicliques, initially empty
TempC = All Bicliques //Use ALG.1
for all tc ∈ TempC do
Calculate Indicators for tc
end for
repeat
tc = first member of TempC
if tc.DOC > δ then
Move tc to C
else
if tc.DI < δ then
Remove tc from TempC
else
SC = Sub-Bicliques of tc // Use ALG.2
Calculate Indicators for all members of SC
TempC = TempC ∪ SC
Remove tc from TempC
end if
end if
until (TC.size > 0)
return C
DI(g) =
GPS +GTS
2
(6.2)
Users is also able to specify the threshold δ for collusion.
The process showing how we find bicliques, sub-bicliques and calculate their re-
lated indicators are proposed in Algorithm 3.
6.2 Architecture
To detect collusion bicliques and enable people to easily query collusion graph, our
model comprises an architecture consists of several parts. The architecture is proposed
in Figure 6.1. The followings are description of what every parts do in the architecture.
• Collusion Detection Part as the main part of the model is responsible for find-
ing bicliques. It is also contains the indicator calculator which is responsible for
calculating collusion indicators corresponding to every detected biclique. More-
over, this part investigate large non-collusive bicliques to find any possible col-
lusive sub-bicliques. Algorithm 3 shows responsibilities of this part.
• Application Interface is the part which is the means which enables users to
query the ORM graph. The queries can be generated by a query builder provided
as a user interface or they can be posted to the system via API.
• Query Parser is responsible for parsing queries received from application inter-
face. It parser queries and converts them to a SPARQL query. By customizing
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Application Interface
(API, UI,…)
Query Parser
Clique Finder
Sub!Clique Finder
Indicator Calculator
Graph Query Engine
Collusion Detection 
Module
Graph Database
Figure 6.1: Overall Architecture of Proposed Model.
this parser, it is possible to put this framework on any database management
system.
• Graph DBMS executes queries receives from query parser and returns the re-
sults to it. This engine should be chosen in accordance with the format of queries
received from query parser.
• Database is a triple-store database. We use RDF triples for representing data
and store them in an RDF store. So, any storage system capable of saving and
retrieving data in RDF format can be used as this part.
6.3 Query Language
In our model, online rating systems are represented as a graph, so it can be processed
and queried using existing graph query languages like SPARQL. The overall format of
a query is as follows:
getbicliques[.product|.reviewer]([v,t,r,m])
[
filter{
[on(list of products);]
[contain(list of users);]
[DOC > delta;]
}
];
This query enables users to:
• Look for specific bicliques containing one or more particular reviewers in their
R or products in their P .
• Look for products which have been attacked by one or more specific reviewers.
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• Look for reviewers who have been collaborated in attacking to one or more par-
ticular products.
• Specify δ as the minimum level of collusiveness in all queries.
• Specify weights for collusion indicators to build more customized queries and
get more adequate results. v, t, r and m are corresponding weights for GRS,
GTS, GRS and GMS respectively.
The followings are sample queries that show the usability of the query language:
Example 1. Adam , a user, wants to find all collusion bicliques in the system. He uses
all default vales, so his query will be as:
getbicliques();
Example 2. Adam wants to find all collusion bicliques in the system. He wants to see
serious attacks so he prefers to see bicliques with DoC > 0.7. So he should write a
query like this:
getbicliques()
filter{
DOC > 0.7;
};
Example 3. Adam is administrator of a system in which similarity of values is so more
important twice time than others. So, he prefers not to use default weights. Rather, he
specifies weights by himself and designs the query as follows:
getbicliques(0.4,0.2,0.2,0.2);
Example 4. With this new indicators weights, Adam intends to see all products which
have been attacked by groups contain ‘Jack’ and ‘Jhon’. So he designs the query as
follows:
getbicliques.products(0.4,0.2,0.2,0.2);
filter{
contains(‘Jack’, ‘Jhon’);
};
Example 5. Adam intends to see all users who have been collaborated on unfairly
ranking products ‘Book1’ and ‘DVD2’. So he may design the query as follows:
getbicliques.reviewers(0.4,0.2,0.2,0.2);
filter{
on(‘Book1’,‘DVD2’);
};
Example 6. As a more detailed query, Adam intends to see all bicliques containing
‘Jack’ and ‘Jhon’ and their targets contain ‘Jack’ and ‘Jhon’. Meanwhile he wants to
see serious attacks with DOC > 0.7 ad indicators weights as 0.4,0.3,0.2 and 0.1. He
may design the query as follows:
getbicliques(0.4,0.3,0.2,0.1)
filter{
contains(‘Jack’, ‘Jhon’);
on(‘Book1’,‘DVD2’);
DOC > 0.7;
};
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Figure 7.1: Snapshot of our front-end tool interface, (A) Predefined Query Templates,
(B) Query Builder and (C) Results Pane.
7 Implementation and Evaluation
7.1 Implementation
To implement our framework we used several techniques for various part of the system.
As graph query language we can use any variant of SPARQL like query languages. As
we have several bicliques to manage here, which every biclique is in fact a subgraph, we
should use a version of SPARQL which simplifies using and managing sub-graphs. We
use FPSPARQL, a folder-enabled query language proposed in our previous work [2]
which makes dealing with bicliques much easier. We also have used engine designed
for FPSPARQL as Graph DBMS. The performance of this query engine is tested and
verified in [2].
We also have implemented a front-end tool to assist users using our query language.
The tool which is shown in Figure 7.1, provides a friendly easy to use interface with
a set of pre-designed templates which makes writing queries easier. Users can choose
a query template and customize it to fit their needs or they can design a query from
scratch. Then they can run the query and see the results on the screen. The query
language is also available via API. It means that other applications can easily contact
the tool and query collusion graph when they need. The snapshot shows the results
received by running following query:
getbicliques(0.4,0.3,0.2,0.1)
filter{
contains(’u1’,’u2’,’u3’,’u6’,’u7’);
on(’p1’,’p2’,’p3’,’p5’,’p6’,’p7’);
DOC > 0.7;
};
7.2 Experimentation and Evaluation
To evaluate our model, we randomly chose 20 groups identified within AMZLog. Then
we asked domain experts to manually check whether these groups are collusive or not.
Experts using their experience and information provided in Amazon web site such as
rating scores, corresponding written reviews,etc analyzed these 20 selected groups. The
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Figure 7.2: Cumulative % of values of collusion indicators for collusive(red/dashed)
and non-collusive (blue/solid) selected groups.
result was 7 out of 20 groups were collusive and 13 groups were identified as honest
groups.We used this dataset to evaluate our model.
Our model contains three main parts. The first part is the algorithms proposed for
finding bicliques and sub-bicliques. These algorithms follow the FIM model. The
performance evaluation of FIM is proposed in its original paper [1] and its is being
used in other similar works like [17].
The second part is the query language proposed for querying collusion graph. All
designed queries are directly converted to FPSPARQL queries using query parser and
then are run on its FPSPARQL query engine. The performance of the FPSPARQL
query engine is tested, and results are available in [2].
The third important part of our model are the indicators which are proposed for
collusion detection and the quality of results they provide. We evaluate this aspect of
our model in following subsections.
7.3 Statistical Evaluation
We calculate four collusion indicators for collusive groups . Then we calculate cu-
mulative distribution of values calculated for every indicator for all groups. We do
the same process also for non-collusive groups. The results of these calculations are
shown in Figure 7.2. In every part of the figure, the vertical axis is the cumulative value
and horizontal axis is the percentage. For every indicator in figure 7.2, the cumulative
distribution chart of the non-collusive groups are on the left side while collusive charts
are more closer to one. It simply means that in average, for every indicator, values cal-
culated for collusive groups are larger than calculated values for non-collusive groups.
Therefor, these indicators and the way they are calculated are truly reflect the behavior
of the group, can be used as indicators to identify collusion groups.
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Figure 7.3: How precision (blue/solid) and recall (red/dashed) change with different
threshold values.
7.4 Evaluating Quality of the Results
To evaluate quality of the results returned by our model, we use the well-known mea-
sures of precision and recall [20]. Precision measures the quality of the results and
is defined by the ration of the relevant results to the total number of retrieved results.
Recall measures coverage of the relevant results and is defined by the ratio of rele-
vant results retrieved to the total number of existing relevant results in database. With
respect to collusion detection, we define precision and recall in equations (7.1) and
(7.2);
precision =
Number of retrieved bicliques which are really collusive
total number of retrieved bicliques
(7.1)
Recall =
Number of retrieved bicliques which are really collusive
total number of collusive bicliques in database
(7.2)
An effective model should achieve a high precision and a high recall. But its is not
possible in real world, because these metrics are inversely related [20]. It means that
cost of improvement in precision is reduction of recall and vice versa. We calculate
precision and recall with different thresholds to show how changing impacts on the
quality and accuracy of the results. Figure 7.3 shows the results of running model
with different threshold values. We do not specify particular value for precision and
recall. We can say that if the user wants to achieve the highest possible values for
both precision and recall metrics, figure 7.3 obviously shows that the optimal value
for threshold (γ) is 0.4. In this case 71% of the bicliques are retrieved and 71% of
retrieved results are really collusive. Using query language, user has opportunity to
increase quality or coverage of data by changing threshold value.
As we described before, our model also calculates damaging impact (DI) of every
group to show how damaging is the group. DI helps users to identify groups that have a
high potential power to damage the system. These groups are mainly groups with high
number of targeted products. Table 7.1 shows a sample list of bicliques and their DI
and DOC. The group 2 has high values for DOC and DI, so it is a dangerous group. On
the other hand, group 9 has mall values for DOC and DI, and is not a really dangerous
group. Looking at group 11 reveals that although the DOC of the groups is small
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Group ID Degree of Collusiveness Damaging Impact
2 0.598 0.599
4 0.37 0.49
6 0.45 0.42
9 0.056 0.173
11 0.121 0.41
Table 7.1: Sample Bicliques with their Degree of Collusiveness and Damaging Impact.
(0.121), but it still can be divided as dangerous because its DI is 0.41 showing that the
damaging potential of the group is still high. DI is also useful when comparing groups
4 and 6. Whereas, the DOC of group 6 is 8% higher than DOC of group 4, but the
DI of group 4 is 7% higher than DI of group 6. Therefore we can judge them similar
rather than putting group 4 after group 6. Without having DI, the damaging potential
of groups like 11 or 4 may be underestimated. This may lead to unfairly manipulating
rating scores.
8 Related Work
Collusion detection has been widely studied in P2P systems [3, 10, 15]. For exam-
ple EigenTrust [10] tries to build a robust reputation score for p2p collaborators but a
research [15] show that it is still subject to collusion. A comprehensive survey on col-
lusion detection in P2P systems can be found here [3]. Models proposed for detecting
colluders in P2P systems are not applicable to online rating systems because in P2P
systems, models are mostly built on relations and communications between people.
But in online rating systems there is no direct relation between raters.
Reputation management systems are also targeted by collusion[22, 23]. Very sim-
ilar to rating systems, colluders in reputation management systems try to promote or
demote reputation scores by Collusion. Some work try to identify collusion using ma-
jority rule [9, 8]. The majority rule is prone to attacks which hijack the product or
colluders try to manipulate reputation slowly by posting scores not far from majority
of community. The other method is weighting votes based on the reputation of the voter
[25, 21, 18]. Temporal analysis of the behavior of the voters is another way for collu-
sion detection [12] which is not sufficient without analyzing other aspects of voting like
reputation of the voter or value of the vote. Yang et. al. [24] try to identify collusion
by employing both majority rule and temporal behavior analysis. Their model is not
still tested thoroughly and just is applied to a specific dataset and a particular type of
attack.
The most similar work to ours, is [17]. In this work Mukherjee et.al. propose a
model for spotting fake review groups in online rating systems. The model analyzes
textual feedbacks cast on products in Amazon online market to find collusion groups.
They use 8 indicators to identify colluders and propose an algorithm for ranking collu-
sion groups based on their degree of spamicity. However, our model is different from
this model in terms of proposed indicators, analyzing personal behavior of the raters
and dealing with redundant rating scores. Also a recent survey [5] shows that buy-
ers rely more on scores and ratings when intend to buy something rather than reading
textual items. So, in contrast with this model we focus on numerical aspect of posted
feedback. However, the model proposed by Mukherjee et.al. is still vulnerable to some
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attacks. For example, if the number of attackers is much higher than honest raters on a
product the model can not identify it as a potential case of collusion.
Another major difference between our work and other related work is that, we
propose a graph data model and a also flexible query language for better understanding,
analyzing and querying collusion. This aspect is missing in almost all previous work.
9 Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper we proposed a novel framework for collusion detection in online rating
systems. We used two algorithms designed using frequent itemset mining technique for
finding candidate collusive groups and sub-groups in our dataste. We propose several
indicators showing the possibility of collusion in group from different aspects. We
used these indicators to assign every group a rank to show their degree of collusiveness
and also damaging impact. We also propose a query language and also a front-end tool
to assist users find collusion groups according their intended criteria. We evaluated
our model first statically and showed the adequacy of the way we define and calculate
collusion indicators. Then we used precision and recall metrics to show quality of
output of our model.
As future direction, we plan to identify more possible collusion indicators. We also
plan to extend the proposed query language with more features and en enhanced visual
query builder to assist users employing our model. Moreover, we plan to generalize
our model apply it to other possible areas which are subject to collusive activities.
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